Cat-1

ΑΡΘΡΑ

ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΚΟΙ ΤΟΜΟΙ

ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΣΕΙΣ

Latest Posts


 

εφημ. ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, 7/12/2022


Η πρόθεση του πρωθυπουργού να επισκεφθεί τις περιοχές της μειονότητας στην Αλβανία είναι μια κίνηση σε λαθεμένη κατεύθυνση. Δεν επρόκειτο να προσφέρει τίποτα ουσιαστικό στα όποια προβλήματα της μειονότητας. Γι’ αυτά αρμόδια είναι η κυβέρνηση της γειτονικής χώρας. Αντίθετα, η συμβολική αυτή κίνηση δίνει τροφή σε κάθε είδους εθνικισμούς στην Ελλάδα, στην Αλβανία, στην Τουρκία και αλλού. Επιπλέον, προσφέρει στην Τουρκία τη δικαιολογία για να παρεμβαίνει ακόμη πιο έντονα στα ζητήματα της μειονότητας στη Θράκη.

Ας συνυπολογιστεί ότι η πρόθεση αυτή εκδηλώθηκε σε μια περίοδο σφοδρών αναταραχών και αναδιανομής των σφαιρών επιρροής. Οι διάφοροι εθνικισμοί και τα υπαρκτά ή ανύπαρκτα προβλήματα των μειονοτήτων είναι η κατάλληλη πυρίτιδα που τροφοδοτεί τις αδηφάγες επιδιώξεις των μεγάλων δυνάμεων αλλά και των περιφερειακών.

Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική θα έπρεπε να κινείται στον αντίποδα, προκειμένου να διασφαλίσει την ειρήνη και την ευημερία του λαού. Θα έπρεπε να προασπίζει τις θεμελιώδεις αρχές του διεθνούς δικαίου. Μια από αυτέςς είναι η αρχή της μη επέμβασης στα εσωτερικά άλλων κρατών. Σημαίνει ότι η δημοκρατία, τα δικαιώματα κάθε λαού μαζί και των μειονοτήτων είναι υπόθεση αποκλειστικά δική του. Κανένα άλλο κράτος και καμιά ξένη κυβέρνηση δεν δικαιούται να παρεμβαίνει δήθεν για το καλό του. Όπως δεν επιθυμούμε παρέμβαση της Τουρκίας στα εσωτερικά μας έτσι και η Ελλάδα δεν πρέπει να παρεμβαίνει στα εσωτερικά άλλων κρατών.

Μια δεύτερη αρχή είναι το αμετάθετο των συνόρων. Στην εποχή μας η αλλαγή των συνόρων είναι αποκλειστικά επιδίωξη των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και των διάφορων εθνικισμών που υποθάλπονται από αυτές. Κανένα λαϊκό, δημοκρατικό ή μειονοτικό πρόβλημα δεν μπορεί να λυθεί με έξωθεν επέμβαση και πολύ περισσότερο με αλλαγή συνόρων. Το δείχνει η εμπειρία των πολλαπλών παραβιάσεων των αρχών του Καταστατικού Χάρτη του ΟΗΕ από τις μεγάλες δυνάμεις (διάλυση Γιουγκοσλαβίας, Κόσοβο, Κουβέιτ-Ιράκ, Αφγανιστάν, Ουκρανία κά).

Στο πνεύμα της υπεράσπισης του διεθνούς δικαίου η Ελλάδα θα έπρεπε να λάβει πρωτοβουλίες για μια πολιτική συνεννόησης των Βαλκανικών κρατών. Αυτή οφείλει να βασίζεται στις αρχές της ειρηνικής επίλυσης των διαφορών, της ουδετερότητας (έξω από στρατιωτικούς συνασπισμούς), της συνεργασίας, του αμετάθετου των συνόρων, της μη επέμβασης στα εσωτερικά των άλλων κρατών, της ανάδειξης των μειονοτήτων σε γέφυρες φιλίας ανάμεσα στους λαούς. Μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία θα ασκούσε ελκτική δύναμη στους λαούς των Βαλκανίων καθώς και πίεση στις κυβερνήσεις.

Ακόμη παραπέρα θα ήταν αναγκαία μια πρωτοβουλία για την ειρήνη στην Ουκρανία με απεμπλοκή της χώρας μας από τον πόλεμο και με διπλωματικές ενέργειες για τον τερματισμό του με επαναφορά στο status quo ante και μέτρα υπό την αιγίδα του ΟΗΕ για την οικοδόμηση μιας δημοκρατικής, ουδέτερης Ουκρανίας εκτός στρατιωτικών συνασπισμών.

Αλλιώς θα ανοίξει η πόρτα της κόλασης. Και τότε θα πρέπει να γράψουμε όπως ο Dante: “εσείς που εισέρχεσθε, αφήστε κάθε ελπίδα”.




 

εφημ. Documento, 4/12/2022


Οι αιτίες του φαινομένου της άγνοιας των πολιτών για το συγκεκριμένο σχέδιο νόμου κατεδάφισης της δημόσιας υγείας πρέπει να αναζητηθεί στους παρακάτω παράγοντες:

1. Στη γενικότερη αποστασιοποίηση των πολιτών από τα κοινά σε μια κοινωνία που καλλιεργεί τον ατομικισμό, τις ατομικές “λύσεις” ενώ λοιδωρεί τις συλλογικές αναζητήσεις και λύσεις.

2. Η δημοκρατία μας περιορίζεται στην εκλογική διαδικασία και μάλιστα σε συνθήκες που δεν υποβοηθούν τη γνήσια έκφραση της λαϊκής βούλησης. Ας σκεφτούμε μόνο τα καλπονοθευτικά εκλογικά συστήματα που μετατρέπουν τη μειοψηφία σε κοινοβουλευτική πλειοψηφία. Εκ των πραγμάτων οι πολίτες ωθούνται στην ανάθεση των προβλημάτων τους στην εκάστοτε κυβέρνηση.

3. Τα συνταγματικά δικαιώματα της απεργίας και της συνάθροισης, με τα οποία κάποιος μπορεί να αντιδράσει, υπονομεύονται στην πράξη (αστυνομική βία, εργοδοτικός αυταρχισμός, κίνδυνος απόλυσης και περιορισμού του εισοδήματος).

4. Τα μέσα ενημέρωσης καλλιεργούν την αίσθηση ότι οι συλλογικοί αγώνες δεν φέρνουν αποτελέσματα, άρα είναι μάταιο να ενδιαφερθεί κανείς για ένα νομοσχέδιο και να το αντιπαλέψει.

5. Τα κυρίαρχα μέσα ενημέρωσης υποβαθμίζουν, αποσιωπούν, διαστρεβλώνουν το περιεχόμενο αυτού ή άλλου νομοσχεδίου και παράλληλα αποπροσανατολίζουν με επιλεγμένο τρόπο την κοινή γνώμη σε άλλα θέματα συχνά απολύτως δευτερεύοντα.

6. Η κυβέρνηση χρησιμοποιεί ως τακτική το δόγμα του σοκ, δηλαδή την ορμητική και συσσωρευμένη επίθεση στις λαϊκές κατακτήσεις. Αυτό δημιουργεί το αίσθημα της παραζάλης και του ανήμπορου στην κοινή γνώμη.

7. Εμπόδιο αποτελεί το γενικότερο χαμηλό επίπεδο πολιτικής γνώσης και συνείδησης, η έλλειψη εξειδικευμένων νομικών γνώσεων προκειμένου να μπορέσει κάποιος να αντιληφθεί στοιχειωδώς το περιεχόμενο ενός νομοσχεδίου.

8. Σε αυτά πρέπει να προστεθεί η απογοήτευση των εργαζομένων καθώς οι όποιες πολιτικές υποσχέσεις τα προηγούμενα χρόνια για εναλλακτική διέξοδο από την κρίση καθώς αποδείχθηκαν στην πράξη απατηλές.

9. Η έλλειψη άμεσης, πειστικής, πραγματικά εναλλακτικής πολιτικής λύσης ωθεί επιπλέον ένα τμήμα της κοινωνίας στην αδράνεια.

Είναι δεδομένο ότι δεν υφίσταται μοντέλο συμμετοχικής δημοκρατίας στη χώρα μας. Εδώ δεν θα μπορούσε να συμβεί αυτό που έγινε πρόσφατα στην Κούβα, όπου το σχέδιο Οικογενειακού Κώδικα, συζητήθηκε πλατιά σε χιλιάδες λαϊκές συνελεύσεις, στην τηλεόραση, στον τύπο και στο τέλος διεξήχθη δημοψήφισμα. Παρά τις αντίξοες αυτές συνθήκες, οφείλουμε να αναλάβουμε τις τύχες στα χέρια μας.



 

εφημ. ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, 23/11/2022


Μετά τον Αμερικανό πρέσβη στην Αθήνα Τζ. Τσούνης ήρθε ο Βρετανός ομόλογος του Μ. Λοτζ να διευκρινίσει για μια ακόμη φορά αυτά που θα έπρεπε να γνωρίζουμε και να έχουμε συνειδητοποιήσει. Βρέθηκε στο ίδιο μήκος κύματος με τον αμερικανό πρέσβη. Σε συνέντευξή του στο ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ δήλωσε πως «στο Λονδίνο, στη Μεγάλη Βρετανία, που είμαστε σύμμαχοι και φίλοι και της Τουρκίας και της Ελλάδας, ανησυχούμε πάρα πολύ όταν υπάρχει τέτοια κλιμάκωση». Και επανέφερε τη μόνιμη επωδό ότι πρέπει να υπάρξει ήρεμος διάλογος ανάμεσα σε Ελλάδα και Τουρκία προκειμένου να λυθούν τα προβλήματα. Η πάγια πολιτική των “ίσων” αποστάσεων, που στην πραγματικότητα ευνοεί τις αντίθετες στο διεθνές δίκαιο επιθετικές αξιώσεις του τουρκικού αντιδραστικού καθεστώτος.

Παράλληλα, φαίνεται να καταρρέουν σαν χάρτινος πύργος οι λοιπές διπλωματικές συμμαχίες της χώρας μας. Η πολυδιαφημισμένη σχέση με το Ισραήλ προβλήθηκε και προβάλλεται ως στρατηγική συμμαχία για την ασφάλεια και την ευημερία των χωρών και της περιοχής. Σημειώθηκε μάλιστα και το εξής παράδοξο. Οι δύο υπουργοί Άμυνας διακήρυξαν πρόσφατα από κοινού την αφοσίωσή τους στο διεθνές δίκαιο με αφορμή την παραβίασή του από την εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία.

Εύλογα διερωτάται κανείς για την αφοσίωση των κυβερνήσεων του Ισραήλ στο διεθνές δίκαιο, όταν διατηρούν υπό την κατοχή τους τον παλαιστινιακό λαό, ενώ κατηγορούνται και για γενοκτονία σε βάρος των Παλαιστινίων. Εύλογα διερωτάται κανείς για την αφοσίωση στο διεθνές δίκαιο, όταν η Ελλάδα έχει στηρίξει όλες τις αντίθετες στο διεθνές δίκαιο στρατιωτικές επεμβάσεις των ΗΠΑ (Σερβία, Ιράκ, Αφγανιστάν και αλλού) αλλά και τις επιθετικές προκλήσεις του ΝΑΤΟ στην Ουκρανία πολύ πριν από τη ρωσική εισβολή.

Από την άλλη σημειώνονται βήματα επαναπροσέγγισης του Ισραήλ με την Τουρκία ενώ η ακροδεξιά κυβέρνηση Νετανιάχου δεν διστάζει να μας πουλήσει, εκτός από αμυντικά συστήματα, γέφυρα συνενεννόησης με την Τουρκία. Αλλά σε ποιά βάση; Στη βάση του σεβασμού του διεθνούς δικαίου; Η απάντηση είναι προφανώς αρνητική. Η μεσολάβηση θα γίνει μαζί με τις ΗΠΑ στη βάση των παραπάνω δήθεν “ίσων” αποστάσεων. Από όλες τις μεριές τίθεται δηλαδή επί τάπητος το σύνολο των παράνομων τουρκικών διεκδικήσεων: χωρικά ύδατα, καθεστώς νησιών κλπ και όχι μόνο το υπαρκτό ζήτημα της οριοθέτησης της υφαλοκρηπίδας/ΑΟΖ.

Και καθώς συμβαίνουν όλα αυτά, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση περί άλλων τυρβάζει. Οργάνωσε στη Λάρισα στρατιωτική άσκηση του ΝΑΤΟ και της ΕΕ για την αντιμετώπιση “ανταρτών” και “διαδηλωτών”. Στο σενάριο μάλιστα οι υποδυόμενοι τους διαδηλωτές φώναζαν συνθήματα υπέρ της ειρήνης και της ελευθερίας. Ταυτόχρονα οι ελληνικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις θα συμμετέχουν στην εκπαίδευση Ουκρανών κομμάντος, οι αμερικανικές βάσεις αναβαθμίζονται, Έλληνες στρατιωτικοί θα συμμετέχουν σε ΝΑΤΟϊκές αποστολές πολύ κοντά στο χώρο των πολεμικών συγκρούσεων.

Βρισκόμαστε παγιδευμένοι εντός του επικίνδυνου αυτού πλαισίου. Καιρός να σκεφτούμε αντισυμβατικά, αφού ο συμβατικός τρόπος σκέψης δεν μας βοήθησε μέχρι σήμερα.


 

εφημ. ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, 18/11/2022


Ο Σουν Τσου στην Τέχνη του πολέμου (V.1) έγραφε: “Για να είμαστε βέβαιοι ότι ο στρατός μας θα αντιμετωπίσει τον εχθρό και δεν θα ηττηθεί, θα πρέπει να χρησιμοποιήσουμε τόσο τις συμβατικές δυνάμεις και μεθόδους (τζενγκ) όσο και τις ανορθόδοξες δυνάμεις και μεθόδους (τσι). Τα τεχνάσματα που μπορούν να χρησιμοποιήσουν όσοι είναι δεξιοτέχνες στη χρήση των ανορθόδοξων δυνάμεων και μεθόδων είναι άπειρα όπως ο ουρανός και η γη και ανεξάντλητα όπως οι μεγάλοι ποταμοί”.

Τα παραπάνω έχουν επιβεβαιωθεί μυριάδες φορές στο ρου της ανθρώπινης ιστορίας και των συγκρούσεων κάθε είδους. Ισχύουν οπωσδήποτε και στο πεδίο της διπλωματίας. Αυτήν ακριβώς την τακτική εφαρμόζει με επιτυχία η κυβέρνηση Ερντογάν. Αυτό που μοιάζει αντιφατικό και αλλοπρόσαλλο στις κινήσεις της είναι απολύτως σχεδιασμένο. Εντάσσεται, ή για την ακρίβεια υποτάσσεται, στο σχεδιασμό της κυρίαρχης τάξης της Τουρκίας για έναν ενισχυμένο περιφερειακό ρόλο.

Η ιστορική εμπειρία των συγκρούσεων έχει αποδείξει ότι η συνδυασμένη χρήση συμβατικών και ανορθόδοξων μέσων μπορεί εξίσου να υπηρετήσει την ειρήνη και την υπεράσπιση της εθνικής κυριαρχίας μιας χώρας. Αλλά δυστυχώς η μέχρι τώρα πρακτική των ελληνικών κυβερνήσεων κινείται στον αντίποδα. Η Ελλάδα είναι ο πρόθυμος σύμμαχος του ΝΑΤΟ. Παρέχει βάσεις, συμμετέχει πολύμορφα στον πόλεμο στην Ουκρανία. Ετοιμάζεται, κατά πληροφορίες, να εκπαιδεύσει Ουκρανούς κομάντο σε ελληνικά στρατόπεδα. Συμφωνεί με τις αποφάσεις στρατιωτικοποίησης της ΕΕ, δέχεται αδιαμαρτύρητα τις οικονομικές επιπτώσεις του πολέμου του ΝΑΤΟ στην Ουκρανία. Από όλα αυτά δεν κερδίζει η ειρήνη αλλά ούτε προάγεται η υπεράσπιση της εθνικής μας κυριαρχίας.

Θυμίζω την πρόσφατη δήλωση (18/10/2022) του αμερικανού πρέσβη στην Άγκυρα Τζ. Φλέικ: “η συνεργασία μας για την ασφάλεια με τους συμμάχους μας στο ΝΑΤΟ, την Τουρκία και την Ελλάδα, δεν βασίζεται στο να πάρουμε θέση ή να αποσταθεροποιήσουμε έναν από τους εταίρους”. Στο ίδιο μήκος κύματος, ο αμερικανός πρέσβης στην Αθήνα Τζ. Τσούνης δήλωσε στις 7/11/2022 πως «διαβιβάζουμε σταθερά σε Ελλάδα και Τουρκία να κάνουν αυτό ακριβώς (να κάνουν διάλογο), επειδή ξέρω ότι και η Ελλάδα και η Τουρκία επιδιώκουν ειρήνη». Και συμπλήρωσε: “ελπίζω στο άμεσο μέλλον, οι υπάρχουσες διαφορές μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας να διευθετηθούν δια της διπλωματικής οδού”.

Για μια ακόμη φορά δηλαδή οι ΗΠΑ, όχι μόνο δεν παίρνουν θέση απέναντι στις αντίθετες στο διεθνές δίκαιο τουρκικές επιδιώξεις και προκλήσεις, αλλά στην πραγματικότητα τις νομιμοποιούν. Αναφέρονται σε διαφορές, όπως υποστηρίζει η Τουρκία, και όχι στη μία και μοναδική υπαρκτή διαφορά που είναι η οριοθέτηση της υφαλοκρηπίδας/ΑΟΖ.

Μήπως λοιπόν ήρθε η ώρα να αξιοποιήσει η Ελλάδα ανορθόδοξα διπλωματικά μέσα μαζί με τα συμβατικά; Θυμιζω πως ένα τέτοιο δείγμα ήταν το κλείσιμο της αμερικανικής βάσης της Ν. Μάκρης και η αποστολή του τότε υπουργού Εξωτερικών στη Σόφια κατά την ελληνοτουρκική κρίση του 1987. Όπως είναι γνωστό, η κίνηση, αν και ημιτελής, έδωσε καρπούς.


 

https://legalform.blog/2022/09/19/contradiction-socialist-society-part-one-kaltsonis/

https://legalform.blog/2022/09/26/the-basic-contradiction-in-socialist-society-part-two-dimitris-kaltsonis/


Marxist theory has provided the basis element for the interpretation of social evolution. That is the contradiction –a dialectical relation between productive forces and relations of production which drives evolution. This basis contradiction is not the only one. Yet it is the fundamental one throughout the course of mankind. Thus, in order to analyze and comprehend the societies that arose from twentieth century revolutions —primarily the October 1917 revolution in Russia— we ought to start from precisely this point.

This is also the case if we wish to comprehend the development of these societies, namely the restoration of capitalism. A lot has been written with regards to this subject; some seek the causes in economy, politics, ideology, while others in a complex nexus, or in a single, or multiple factors. In order to keep in line with the scientific Marxist methodology we ought to pinpoint the basic contradiction and subsequently define its relation to other contradictions. Therefore, it is imperative that one start with the relation between productive forces-relations of production.



Productive Forces and Division of Labor


The development of the productive forces, primarily tools, labor experience and human knowledge is what urged primitive societies towards the social division of labor and thus to the increase of the productive potential and the production of surplus. The social division of labor (along with the production of surplus and therefore the possibility to exploit labor power) in turn lead to the emergence of private ownership and the social division into antagonistic classes. In this manner, the development of the productive forces led to new relations of production, which were qualitatively different than those of primitive communities.1 This analysis by the founders of Marxism has been multiply confirmed by later historical and anthropological findings.

The crucial question that begs our attention here is that the social division of labor (some administer and direct, some are involved in one field of production, others engage in another field of production, etc.) was the thing that led to the emergence of private ownership and classes. Social classes constitute the completed, qualitatively differentiated expression of the division of labor. That is why, the founders of Marxism, in their analyses, predict in a theoretically consistent way that in the communist mode of production, which will replace the capitalist mode of production, both social classes and the social division of labor will be eradicated.

The prerequisite for this is the rise of the productive forces in such a level so that the basic needs of humans are met and a relevant consciousness is established. Therefore, we see that the complete elimination of the classes is bound to lead, historically speaking to end “enslaving subordination of subjects as to the division of labor”.2 For Marx, this means that the technical division of labor shall continue to exist in the communist society but there will be no social division. In Lenin’s words (concerning the division between administers and administrated): “in socialism all shall administrate in turn and they will soon get used to no administration”.3

Social division (especially the division between administers and administrated) is an element that can, among others, lead to the reappearance of classes. This is obvious in the remarks of the founders of Marxism, who, by studying the experience of the Paris Commune they observed that the working class may lose its power after the socialist revolution if the “special interests” of the state’s authority prevail. That is, the special interests of those who, concerning the division of labor, are engaged with the state administration in a permanent and professional basis.4


Revolution and productive relations


The socialist revolution creates the conditions –only the conditions- for the emancipation of the productive forces from the bonds of capitalist property. It creates the conditions so that the social character of production corresponds to the social way of the appropriation of the social product.

The formation of new relations of production is not a day’s work but a process that begins with the first, decisive action, i.e. the revolution and the abolition of private ownership of basic means of production. The creation of the new relations of production begins with the establishment of state ownership (the new state resulting from the revolution). It is integrated when the socialization of the means of production becomes not only typical (by means of state ownership) but essential, immediate, i.e. when the society truly participates in the control of the whole production process.

It has been historically proved that the beginning of founding new relations of the new relations of production emancipated the productive dynamics of the countries where the revolution prevailed. It is well known that the USSR, China and other countries, during the first decades, moved ahead-made a leap from a profound backwardness and underdevelopment to modern productive structures.5

Τhis moving forward-leap of the first period was due to the new relations of production, which enabled the planned development, and enhanced the workers’ interest in work and its outcome. Lenin claimed that the strength of the new relations of production might be the huge productivity growth of work that could greatly overcome the respective/relevant one in capitalism: “Capitalism can be definitely destroyed and will be definitely destroyed because socialism creates a new, much higher labor productivity”.6 The growth of labor productivity may be based on the workers’ interest in their work and the feeling that they are the owners of the means of production and economy.

How would the growth of productive forces interact with the relations of production. By enabling the transition to a degree where the socialization of the means of production would be less typical and more essential than in the beginning of the post-revolutional period. That is, the growth of productive forces, thus the ability for a higher level of life for the workers, higher educational and cultural level, more and more creative free time, allow a more essential participation in the administration of the state and the economy.

To be accurate, this ability could have been realized if the relations of production were consciously readjusted to this direction. What would that mean? A broader and more essential participation in decisions, an even more genuine democracy. But this never happened – exactly the opposite. Not only in USSR but also in other ex-socialist countries the new relations of production were gradually unraveled, the growth of the productive forces began to delay, and this resulted in the restoration of capitalism.


The basic contradiction


In order to explain this experience we must examine the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production from the perspective of society and its class structure. This contradiction, in the frame of capitalism, means that the basic social contradiction is the one between the bourgeoisie and the worker class.

Respectively, what does this mean for the post-revolutionary society? The relations of production change dramatically because the bourgeoisie is eliminated. Of course, this takes place gradually. Although the classes are eliminated, this is not the case for the social division of labor. The focal point of the social division of labor is the the division between the administrators and the administrated. The contradiction between the working and the middle class is deleted and it gives its place to another contradiction that is to be overcome.

As mentioned above, the administrative work is historically the outcome of the growth of the productive forces. It was both an advance and a step before the division of society into classes. The administrative work is our focus here not at its lowest level, the level of the unit of production, or the community industry, but at the level of the nationwide administration of labor and society in general.

As a matter of fact, this division exists in all class societies. It is defined and colored by the basic class contradiction. The administrative work across the whole society or, in other words, the elite of the state bureaucracy is done by the ruling class or its representatives or by its members or followers.

The building of new relations of production after the socialist revolution demands a new handling of this matter. It is not sufficient that the working class members or the representatives or those under its control do the administrative work. It is not sufficient that the elite of the state bureaucracy arise from the working class.

It may be sufficient for the first phase of building the new social system, but not for the follow up. The nature of the new relations of production itself presupposes the full participation of the working class to manage its affairs. The crucial matter for the establishment of the communist relations of production is the gradual growth, both qualitative and quantitative, of the people’s participation in the administration of production and generally of all the social issues. The figures/measures in this matter are not estimated once and for all.

On the other hand, why is the existence of a separate administrators' stratum in the field of politics and economy deemed inevitable for a certain historical period? First and foremost, the answer lies in the fact that not all productive forces are equally developed, so as to be able to concern themselves with just about everything in a collective manner, and to take turns in different sorts of tasks, including directorial positions. Therefore, it is inevitable that they still need the aid of professionalism in politics. At the same time, the level of knowledge, education, experiences, political and social consciousness is different for each worker. Conclusively, the potential and/or the will to participate in community matters are differentiated as well.

The construction of those new social relations demands the gradual transcendence of all the above limits and obstacles. A cook should learn how to be an efficient leader and should be able indeed to preside over state matters as well. In such an attempt of transcending the limits and, at the same time, creating the prerequisites necessary for building up the future, social revolutions and Marxist theorists emphasized the importance of a new revolutionary democracy, which should be governed by five fundamental principles:

1. Eligibility of all accountable officers of the state, so that the working class and the people in general be able to choose themselves to whom they will entrust these duties.

2. Immediate revocation, so that the working class and the body politic in general be able to withdraw whoever proved unworthy of their trust, such as the capitalist fires his/her manager if proved anti-productive, incompetent or thief.

3. Succession of people in all accountable positions, so as to avoid «authorities», «irreplaceable» people, but, on the contrary, all shall learn in action the duties of state administration.

4. A bottom-up, constant and effective inspection. This requires debate and criticism, basic information and knowledge, abolition of “truisms”, the alleged state secrets.

5. Abolition of every privilege for professional politicians and a simple labor paycheck for state employees, so as to reduce patronage relations in job hunting and careerism. This issue was of great importance for Marx, Engels and Lenin.7

These measures are an effective means to lessen the negative effects of the division of labor, especially the division between administrators and administrated. The revolutionary democracy is an essential part not only of the superstructure but of the new relations of production as well. Socialist relations of production do not only mean state ownership of the means of production, but participatory democracy for the people.

From a historical perspective, the revolutionary democracy may lead to the elimination of labor division. However, as mentioned earlier, at the same time it is necessary to strengthen the productive forces and upgrade the living standard and the knowledge of the people, and many other factors. Subsequently, the stabilization and development of the revolutionary democracy is a key for the advance of the social development and the resolution of the basic contradiction between administrators and administrated.

As Lenin has noted, «by taking this road (that is, by applying policy measures of the Commune-like revolutionary democracy – my explanatory note) we shall achieve the abolition of bureaucracy», in such conditions “that shall allow absolutely everybody to undertake ''state operations'' and this shall lead to the withering away of the State as such (note: emphasis by Lenin himself).8


The possibility of turning the contradiction into an antagonistic one


The division of labor, objectively, requires a relative autonomy of administrative work. This is also the case in class and socialist societies. This relative autonomy may be tolerated or even desirable in capitalist society.

However, this does not happen in socialist societies. The nature of a socialist society is fundamentally different. It demands a constant move forward, for the elimination of the division. Therefore, any expansion of self-efficiency endangers the process to the total abolition of the social division of labor, and undermines the march towards the increasingly inclusive participation of workers.

As mentioned above, administrative work is not unnecessary in socialist society. The contrary has been proved not only theoretically by major thinkers, but also historically.9 The socialist society needs administrators. However, their role in socialist society is subject to transformation, and finally, from a historic point of view, shall be eliminated.

Therefore, in socialist society, after the elimination of the contradiction between the bourgeois and the working class, the next important contradiction that remains to be resolved is the one between the working class and the administrators of its economy, and its State.

The relative self-efficiency of the ruling state bureaucracy expands when:

1. the revolutionary democracy does not function properly, the aforementioned principles are not actually observed, and, as a result, the political and economic decisions are made by the aforementioned bureaucracy without the true participation of the workers, 2. the ruling managerial stratum tends to attain a bigger share of the social product than the one according to the services it provides. To be sure, I refer to the salary and other privileges (legal or illegal, this is not the point here) that the administrators of the socialist states gradually accumulated. In those cases, the contradiction tends to become antagonistic, and, as we shall see, under certain circumstances, it becomes one.


The soviet and other experiences


In the Soviet Union and the rest of the former socialist states those phenomena were observed and finally prevailed. The democratic institutions of direct and representative democracy gradually weakened. The assemblies, the electoral procedures, the principles of eligibility, the power of the people to control their representatives, revocation, became formal procedures, usually dictated by the governing communist party.

This did not apply in every socialist state in the same way and at the same degree. Nor did it apply in the same way and at the same degree in different chronological periods. However, it was a common feature, a common, more or less, tendency.

For example, the practice of one and only candidacy in electoral procedures prevailed.10 This meant that the communist party submitted, directly or through a trade or other union, one candidate. The electorates were not able to choose someone else, only to approve or disapprove of the particular candidate. This applied even in those states which by law allowed many candidacies. In this way, the revolutionary parties lost their vigor and their connection with the people who had been forged in revolutionary conditions. The electoral procedure became pretentious. The debate and the control over the representatives faded away or ended up as pure formality.

It is significant that, since 1937, the Soviet leaders themselves mentioned certain degenerative phenomena, due to which all democratic procedures of the Soviets had become merely a pretext for patronage relations, where the representatives of the people were uncontrollable.11 They did not answer for their actions or when they did, they were not sincere and genuine, while at the same time they felt that their reelection was guaranteed. There are other similar testimonies. For example, a Cuban reporter in Moscow, who was there during the last phase of the Soviet Union, spoke about «corrupted electoral procedures».12

All the Constitutions of the socialist countries provided for the revocation of the representatives. However, this right was barely exercised, at least at the level of the supreme representative institutions.13 Hence, election and revocation, along with the people’s bottom-up control and the interchange of individuals in public positions weakened dramatically.

There were similar developments in another crucial sector of socialist democracy: the workplaces. The participation of workers in public discussions, in order to make important decisions on economy became largely a formal procedure as well. As Carlos Tablada, a Cuban economist, observes, the burden fell unilaterally to the implementation of decisions that had already been taken by the governmental ranks and not to the participation of the workers in discussing and evaluating the policies.14 Che made similar observations many years ago.15

Historical experience has also shown that the administrators did not enjoy only political but also material privileges. The fact that the administrators were responsible for decision making gave them material self-sufficiency, concerning living conditions and standards. The abolition of the bourgeois state by the revolutions and the establishment of socialist states had been characterized by the abolition of material privileges for the administrators.

However, a reestablishment of such privileges gradually became evident. For example, in the Soviet Union this tendency appeared from scratch. Lenin soon realized this problem. When he wrote State and Revolution he had already felt the need to intervene, by emphasizing that «all those Bolsheviks who take action» proposing salary increase for state officials, instead of cutting it down to the standard worker's level «are totally unpardonable».16 It is interesting to notice that this procedure is recorded in the soviet literature, even in the officially accepted one by Stalin's governance.17

The ratio between the basic salary and the salaries of the highest official ranks in the Soviet Union had already been shaped during the 1930s into 1:10 and later into 1:15 or even 1:20. Similar were the developments in other socialist countries. In China, this income gap had already reached a 1:10 ratio during the 1950s and 1960s and a 1:15 during other periods.18

Along with wage benefits came material benefits such as, for instance, access to special services in health, education, accommodation and so on. It is indicative that the high-ranking members of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union had at their disposal, at least in the latter period, service staff, gardeners and so on. These legal privileges were actually supplemented by other, illegal ones that were allowed though by the highest administrative stratum.19

In such conditions, the contradiction, although it is not antagonistic, it tends to become one. This tendency is enhanced, especially if we take into account firstly that it is constantly influenced by the residues of the opposition between labor and capital, that remain in every country, and secondly the antagonism between capitalist and socialistic states.



Bureaucracy and bourgeois class


However, the autonomy of the administrators does not render them bourgeois class. The leading bureaucratic stratum should not be identified with bourgeois class, and a socioeconomic system of this period should not be identified with capitalism.20 None of the fundamental characteristics of capitalist society, as they were analyzed in Das Capital, existed in the former Soviet Union and other states.

There was no private ownership of the means of production. Workforce was not a commodity, it was not bought or on sale by the capitalists. There was absolutely no unemployment, which is an important element for the buying and selling of labor force. Various enterprises did not compete against each other, but they were under a national planning (although there were internal contradictions). Anarchy was not a feature of soviet economy, as it is in capitalist economies. Τhe enterprises did not aim to derive surplus. The financial system was not characterized by periodical crises of over-accumulation and overproduction. There was no tendency of relative or absolute impoverishment, as in capitalist accumulation.21

The leading bureaucratic stratum did not own the means of production, not even collectively. It might have gained more from the social product than what it should gain according to its labor, but this is not the same as the mechanism of deriving surplus value. The material benefits of bureaucracy were definitely a violation of the socialist concept of distribution «to each one according to his/her labor” but they were not surplus value neither could they turn into capital in the conditions of the soviet and other socialist societies. There was no tendency to increase labor exploitation. There was no constant influx of new technologies and fixed capital, nor intensification of labor. On the contrary, what characterized these countries during the latter period was the difficulty in embodying new technologies in production, and low labor productivity.22

Under certain circumstances, the administrative bureaucratic stratum is able to become a class as such. This observation was confirmed in the former Soviet Union, in China and all the former socialist countries, except Cuba. The new bourgeois class that was established after the regime overthrows, consists, at least in part, of the former administrative stratum. However, two important factors were necessary for this: firstly, the absolute deconstruction of the socialist state, and secondly, the privatization of the basic means of production. Those requirements were fulfilled from 1989-1991 onwards. Today’s capitalists in those countries do not spring mainly from the descendants of former owners whose private property was expropriated during the revolution, but from this particular stratum.23



The nature of bureaucracy in socialism


On the other hand, a full understanding of bureaucracy's precise nature in socialism is extremely important. It is the key to understand the development of the former USSR and other socialist countries. It also explains many contradictions of internal and external policy. Bureaucracy was like a cancerous tumor. It developed mutually and aggressively over the organism of the socialist state, by spreading over, weakening and modifying it.

The bigger the distance between the leading bureaucracy from the working class, the greater the negative effects and the alteration, making it more difficult to fix the mistakes. This distance grew as the society moved away from the revolution of 1917 (this stands for the other countries as well), and thus the memories, the status and the alertness of the working class and of the people weakened, while the political and material privileges and the corrupted bureaucracy grew up. Therefore, bureaucracy in the Soviet Union during the 1930s did not have the characteristics of the 1980s. The former did not lead to capitalist restoration, while the latter did. The former passionately defended socialism (in spite of its inherent errors and problems), while the latter transformed into bourgeois class.

This particular distance started to broaden, depending on the particular historical conditions, specifications, traditions etc., as the other contradictions affected the basic contradiction. Thus, extreme phenomena that had to do with bureaucratic distortions can be explained, such as the governance of Enver Hoxha in Albania, of N. Ceausescu in Romania or Kim Jong-un in North Corea. However, as it happened in the case of Eastern Europe, the administrative bureaucratic stratum led the transition back to capitalism and became a bourgeois class, although it had to sacrifice one of its iconic figures (in the case of Ceausescu).

This detachment was the material basis that urged for a consolidation of negative and fallacious (from the point of view of Marxism and the interests of the working class) views and practices. It encouraged decisions not by the people themselves, but on behalf of the people. This was a kind of paternalism. Thus, even decisions in favor of the people’s interests were undermined in the long run, because people did not participate actively. At the same time, the administrators developed a gradual indifference for people's lives.

That consequently promoted the consolidation of the negation of criticism and democracy since bureaucracy sought to be infallible and immune. Criticism was considered as anti-revolutionary and often led to hard, oppressive measures. This explains the roughness of the internal party disputes and purges. In countries with no established bureaucracy, such as Cuba, internal party conflicts did not end in purges or, even worse, physical extermination. Fidel Castro, for example, blamed Stalin’s ruling for «a policy of endless persecutions and all kinds of power misuse in the USSR» which led to «uncountable strategic errors in the political field, and in the military sector as well».24

The establishment of the bureaucratic stratum paved the way for administrative methods of enforcement instead of persuasion. This led to the lack of trust to the people, underestimation of spontaneity and overvaluation of the conscious. This establishment of bureaucracy led not only to the consolidation of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois political standards, such as leadership, the enhanced role of the leader against collectivity, even to the cult of personality.

The negation of democracy meant that important decisions were made without democratic debate among the people, or, sometimes, among the party and state leaders. For instance, the decision to send soviet troops to Afghanistan was never discussed in the Supreme Soviet, nor among the government, nor the Politburo Committee of the CPSU.25 Likewise, the «Great Leap Forward» in China did not have the authorization of the government, or of the highest levels of China's CP.26 Indicative of the aversion of democratic procedures is the fact that the voting for the nomination of political mentors within the ruling Polish Unified Labor Party was open until 1981.27 The same was true for the CPSU during the 30s. It is obvious that under such circumstances the electoral procedure was under the control of the leadership.

The bureaucratization of the leadership often gave rise to wrong decisions of nationalistic nature in foreign policy, since the need for broader self-protection of the socialist state was overestimated, and the need for the growing of the revolutionary movement was underestimated. From this point of view, a typical example is the initial reluctance of the USSR to support the revolutionary movement in Angola.28 A more extreme example is China, especially the triggering of military conflict with the Soviet Union in 196929 and later with Vietnam.30

At the level of ideology, the establishment of bureaucracy distorted the Marxist-Leninist theory implementing elements of dogmatism, verbalism and beautification of situations in order to justify itself, instead of scientifically analyzing the constantly changing reality.

A view of social harmony was put forward. A soviet manual in 1954 claimed that «the main particularity of aforementioned conflicts in soviet society has to do with the fact that they do not constitute actual contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production. Such kinds of contradictions simply do not exist in the USSR»31. Another variation suggested that the adaptation of relations of production was automatic, while the concept of relations of production was detached from the concept of people’s participation and deepening of democracy.32 The only contradictions that were accepted were the ones deriving from the remnants of capitalism in economy or ideology, and most certainly the contradiction with the international bourgeois class.

From a historical perspective, as the bureaucratic stratum came close to becoming a bourgeois class, it integrated social-democratic elements into its ideology. During the restoration, almost all those parties turned into social-democratic ones.



The basic contradiction and the lesser ones


Therefore, this basic contradiction, which under certain circumstances tends to be antagonistic, colors and directs all other contradictions of socialist society. For instance, the autonomy of the leading state bureaucracy may exacerbate the contradiction between industrial and rural economy, when with its decisions, which are not authorized by the people, it tries to solve the problems. This is the case, even if its solutions are objectively right, but the people are not convinced for their validity.

The basic contradiction, to the extent that it is not in a process of being resolved, counteracts with the productive forces, thus delaying their growth. Therefore, it has historically been observed that the initial liberation of productive forces which took place after the revolution, was restricted soon after.

This was mostly evident in the main productive force, labor. Productivity of labor, interest in labor, is the driving force of socialist economy. While at first there was a massive increase of labor productivity, later on, indifference for labor prevailed. This was due to the fact that the workers felt all the more alienated from the political and economic decisions33.

There was an attempt to address these problems (the workers’ lack of interest in labor, excessive centralization of planning without real democratic debate – thus unrealistic and inefficient) by expanding commodity relations in the 60s (Kosygin’s reformation).34 That is to say, a tool that caused other problems was used, instead of turning back to the main tool, that could revive the workers’ interest but it would also affect the political privileges of bureaucracy: the restitution of revolutionary democracy and essential democratic participation in political and economic decision making.

Vice versa, the basic contradiction may escalate due to other contradictions. For instance, the fact that the revolution prevailed in a country with low development of productive forces, and high percentage of small-property ownership, feudal remnants, low educational and cultural level, all these led to the autonomy of the administrators and made it difficult for people to be interested in administrating their own matters. Therefore, all these prevent the resolving of the main contradiction.

The resolving of the basic contradiction, entailed in a socialist society, is also decisively affected by the basic contradiction that characterizes human society as such. That is to say, it is affected by the contradiction between working and bourgeois class, in three ways: First of all, in the form of the contradiction between states where bourgeois class maintains power, and those states where revolutions have prevailed. Secondly, in the form of the contradiction between bourgeois and working class within capitalist countries. The fluctuations of the balance of power affect those countries that attempt to build socialism (and vice versa). Thirdly, in the form of capitalist leftovers (in economy, politics, ideology, culture etc.) that still remain within socialist countries. As a result, we must see the basic internal contradiction of socialist countries (administrators-administrated) and the basic external contradiction (bourgeois-working class) and their mutual interaction.

The basic internal contradiction (as well as the basic external one) reflects and affects the political, ideological, legal and cultural superstructure. Respectively, political, ideological, legal and cultural relations –since they have a relative self-sufficiency- counteract with the basic contradiction. They may affect its final resolving one way or another.

However, an approach that attributes the resolution of the basic contradiction to one or another factor, would be incomplete, if it overestimated the importance of political etc. decisions. To be precise, such an analysis would tend to idealism and the negation of the basic principles of dialectical and historical materialism.

For instance, it is important to evaluate the politics of the CPSU under the leadership of Stalin, Khrushchev, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, etc. That is to say, to examine the way in which they contributed to the resolution of the basic contradiction and to what direction. More important, however, is to interpret their policies in the light of the basic contradiction (and the lesser contradictions as well).

Those views according to which «all decisions were fundamentally correct then» or vice versa, cannot explain why, before or after this period, everything was wrong or the opposite. These views look at the surface, the political or ideological superstructure. They are unable to perceive the progress of the society based on the basic or lesser contradictions. We have to use a materialistic approach, in order to explain the reason why specific decisions were made and certain political tendencies prevailed instead of others.

According to some views, the leadership of the CPSU took a social-democratic turn, because of the bourgeois leftovers and the ideological influence of imperialism, that is the international bourgeois class. Such views are only partly true. They see one side of the truth, some of the existing contradictions, but they close their eyes to the basic internal contradiction. Therefore, they fail to explain, in a convincing and comprehensive way, why those deviations finally prevailed.

Such an interpretation cannot explain why socialist Cuba endured almost half a century, in total seclusion and without other socialist countries nearby. Why didn’t the determining bourgeois and international imperialism leftovers affect Cuba? (at least up to now) The answer lies obviously in the fact that this influence did not prevail because bureaucracy did not detach itself from the people, up to a point, because the basic internal contradiction tended to be rightly resolved.35 As long as this specific feature exists, socialist Cuba will be able to continue its course.

The bourgeois class of imperialist countries and the leftovers of the bourgeois class within the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would not have been able to overturn the revolutionary procedures, if they were not based on bureaucratic detachment and corruption of the administrators.


The procedure of resolving the basic contradiction


The road to resolving the basic contradiction goes necessarily through the continuous, persistent and strenuous effort of preserving and deepening revolutionary democracy. It goes through the continuous control of the administrators by the workers and the people, and the ongoing effort to raise the educational, cultural and political level of the working class, their scientific knowledge, so that people’s participation and control become more essential day by day. This means alertness, i.e. conscious interference for a more and more effective implementation of the revolutionary democratic values of the Paris Commune and the Soviets: eligibility, revocability, interchange, monitoring, abolition of privileges, normal working salary for the state officials. This attempt cannot be straightforward. It is influenced by other, internal or international, contradictions.

To the extent that this procedure moves forward, one could say that the relations of production move forward as well, one step at a time, stage by stage, from formal socialization to an essential one. This positive progress shall affect in turn the productive forces and mainly the productivity of labor by developing them further. The further development of the productive forces and social wealth shall form the material basis (as a possibility, not as an automatic realization), so that the socialization and participation of the working class etc. can move deeper, into a continuous spiral development. The positive progress towards the resolving of the contradiction between the administrators and the administrated has also a beneficial influence on the resolving or overcoming of lesser contradictions.

In this procedure of preserving and deepening democracy, the role of the revolutionary party is crucial. The latter can and should become the driving force. The deepening of revolutionary democracy cannot be based only on spontaneity.

However, objectively speaking, as a ruling party, it is a part of the basic contradiction, and it is possible (as proved by historical experience, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) to become part of the problem. Therefore, it is crucial to preserve the revolutionary and democratic character of the party, subjecting it to people’s control and self-regulation via the implementation of the revolutionary democratic values of the Paris Commune: eligibility of party leaders, revocability, interchange, control by the members, ordinary wages for government officials, no material privileges. Only on this basis can the party retain its ideology, its relation with the working class and its revolutionary role.

In conclusion, it is necessary to recognize the dangers entailed in the detachment of the administrative stratum and in the bureaucratic corruption, so as to revive the revolutionary effort in the 21st century. This by no means degrades the importance of the social achievements by the people in the Soviet Union (and other socialist countries), nor their great contribution to the victory against fascism and to world peace during the last half of the 20th century.


1 See for instance F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, [Greek Edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1981]), pp. 167 ff..

2 See K. Marx, Critique of the Gotta Program, [Greek edition, Athens, εκδ. Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1983], p. 214.

3 See V.I. Lenin, “State and Revolution”, Collected Works, v. 33, [Greek edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 116.

4 See K. Marx, The Civil War in France, [Greek Edition, Athens, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 2000], p. 20.

5 See D. Kotz, “Socialism and capitalism: Lessons from the demise of state socialism in the Soviet Union and China”, in R. Pollin (edit.), Socialism and radical political economy: Essays in honor of Howard Sherman, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2000, p. 300-317. See also relevant tables for the Soviet Union in G. Polimeridis,Scientific Socialism: a criticism to its critics, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Εντός, 2011], p.43 ff. On China, see J. Guillermaz, Le Parti communiste chinois au pouvoir, v. 1, Paris, Payot, 1979, p. 247 ff. and M.-C. Bergère, La République populaire de Chine de 1949 a nos jours, Paris, Armand Colin, 1987, p. 51 ff.

6 See V.I. Lenin, “The Great Initiative”, Collected Works, v. 39, [Greek Edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 21.

7 See indicatively, K. Μarx, The Civil War in France [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 2000] and Lenin, “State and Revolution”, Collected Works, v. 33, [Greek Edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 44.

8 See V.I. Lenin, “State and Revolution”, Collected Works, v. 33, [Greek Edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 117.

9 See indicatively F. Engels, “On Authority”, Selective Works, v. 1, [Greek Edition, εκδ. ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ], pp. 767.

10 See Chtchiglik, Lautogestion socialiste, Moscou, éd. Progrès, 1989, pp. 88 ff.

11 See Α. Zhdanov, “Address in the Plenary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 29/2/1937”, [Greek edition, Κομμουνιστική Επιθεώρηση, 4/2008], pp. 145 ff.

12 See P. Prada, “Por que cayo el sosialismo en Europa? Por que no cayo Cuba?”, 9/9/2015, www.cubadebate.cu

13 See indicatively M. Miaille, L'État du droit, [Greek Edition, Thessaloniki, εκδ. Παρατηρητής, 1989], pp. 188 ff and Β.Ι. Lenin, Report on the Right of Recall at a Meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, 21 November 1917”, Collected Works, v. 35, [Greek Edition, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], pp. 106-107 and 109-111.

14 See Carlos Tablada, Che Guevara, Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism, [Greek translation, Athens, εκδ. Διεθνές βήμα, 2014], p. 305 and Charles Bettelheim, Class Struggles in the USSR, [Greek Edition, v. 2 (1923-1930), Athens, εκδ. Κέδρος, 1974], pp. 204 ff..

15 See the similar views of Che in D. Kaltsonis, Che on State and Revolution, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Τόπος, 2012], pp. 152 ff.. as well as the bibliography.

16 See Β.Ι. Lenin, “State and Revolution”, v. 33, [Greek Edition, Athens, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 78 and, by the same author, “The salaries of high Ranking Employees and Officials”, Collected Works, v. 35, [Greek Edition, Athens, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1985], p. 105.

17 See Vsevolod Anissimovich Kochetov, The Brothers Yershov (1958).

18 See Ε. Μandel, Power and Money, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Πρωτοποριακή βιβλιοθήκη, 1994], p. 112 ff. and Charles Bettelheim, Class Struggles in USSR, op.c., v. 1 (1917-1923), p. 107 and v. 2 (1923-1930), p. 247 [Greek Editions] and Μihailo Markovic, Self Organization, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Επίκουρος, 1975], p. 51 and Α. VlahouP. Maurokefalos, The socialistic transformation in China, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Ίδρυμα Μεσογειακών Μελετών, 1989], pp. 169-170 and P. Trolliet, La Chine et son économie, Paris, Armand Colin, 1981, p. 264.

19 For more, see D. Kaltsonis, Estado y democracia en el siglo XXI, Madrid, Munoz Moya Editores, 2018, p. 69 ff.

20 See Eu. Bitsakis, A specter is haunting Europe [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Στάχυ, 1992], pp. 196-197 and Τ. Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia, [Greek Edition, Αthens, εκδ. Μαρξιστικό Βιβλιοπωλείο, 2005] , pp. 151 ff. and D. Kaltsonis, Estado y democracia en el siglo XXI, Madrid, Munoz Moya Editores, 2018, pp. 97 ff.

21 See Ε. Mandel, Τhe contradictions in the theory of “State Capitalism”, [Greek Edition, Αthens, εκδ. Πρωτοποριακή βιβλιοθήκη, 1984], pp. 27 ff. and Ν.V. Yakushev, “The Theory of State Capitalism in USSR” [Greek Edition, Κομμουνιστική Επιθεώρηση, v. 6/2002], http://www.komep.gr/2002-teyxos-6/h-theoria-peri-yparkshs-kratikoy-kapitalismoy-sthn-essd.

22 See E. Che Guevara, Apuntes criticos a la Economia Politica, Ocean Press, La Habana- Melbourne, 2006, p. 9 ff.

23 In China the same phenomenon was observed after the shift of the economy of the market that was evident in the revision of the Constitution in 1993, see M.-C. Bergère, Capitalismes et capitalistes en Chine, Paris, Perrin, 2007, p. 258-259, 299-300, 303, 305-306, 309 and J.P. Cabestan, Le système politique chinois, Paris, Sciences Po/Les presses, 2014, p. 432 ff., 465.

24 See Ι. Ramonet, One Hundred Hours with Fidel, [Greek edition, Athens, εκδ. Πατάκη, 2007], p. 68.

25 See many examples of the antidemocratic operation of the leadership of the CP OF USSR in Yegor Kuzmich Ligatsev, The Gorbacev Riddle, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1994].

26 It was a violation of the decisions of the 8th Conference of CP of China. See USSR Academy of Sciences, Criticism of the theoretical terms of Maoism, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Πλανήτης, χ.χρ.], p. 61, 118.

27 See Ν. Κotzias, Polland and Us,[Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Σύγχρονη Εποχή, 1981], p. 38.

28 See F. Castro, Cuba and Africa [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Διεθνές Bήμα, 2006].

29 See L. Μaitan, Party, Army and Masses in China, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Eργατική Πάλη, 2012], p. 262.

30 See Μ. Young, Vietnam Wars 1945-1990, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Οδυσσέας, 2008], p. 407.

31 See Institute of USSR Philosophical Academy of Sciences, Dialectical Materialism, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. Γνώσεις, 1954], pp. 224 ff., 230.

32 See also USSR Academy of Sciences, Political Economy, [Greek Edition, Athens, Πολιτικές και λογοτεχνικές εκδόσεις, 1961], pp. 510-511.

  1. 33 See L. Corvalàn, El derrumbe del poder sovietico, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Los Andes, 1993, p. 69.

  1. 34 See J.L. Rodriguez, “La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones”, I-VI, Cubadebate, 2016, www.cubadebate.cu, and Β. Logatsev, “The debate between the tendencies on soviet political economy as a reflection of the contradictions of soviet economy” and Ν. Cagolov, “The trade-financial relations in the system of the planned and organized socialist production”, in the volume October Revolution and our age, [Greek Edition, Athens, εκδ. ΚΨΜ, 2017], p. 195 ff. and 227 ff.

  1. 35 See A. Silva Leon, Breve historia de la revolucion Cubana, La Habana, editorial de ciencias sociales, 2003, p. 65 f., 68 and R. Alarcón, “La democracia cubana no se agota en la representación formal, sino que incorpora mecanismos y formas de la democracia directa”, Rebelión, 6/12/2003, www.rebelion.org και J.C. Guanche, Estado, participación y representación politicas en Cuba: diseño institucional y práctica politica tras la reforma constitucional de 1992, Buenos Aires, CLASCO, 2011 (in english J.C. Guanche, “Citizen participation in the Cuban state”, Socialism and Democracy, 30:1, pp. 72 ff.) and U. Aquino, Or. Cruz, J.C. Guanche, R. Hernandez, “Veinte anos: la reforma constitucional (1992-2002)”, Temas, n. 81-82, 2015, p. 111 ff. and D. Ralfus Pineda, “El sistema electoral cubano: de la representación formal a la participación real”, Temas, n. 78, 2014, p. 64 ff. and E. Duharte, “Updating the Cuban political model: For a systemic and democratic-participatory transformation”, Socialism and Democracy, 30:1, p. 35 ff. and D. Ralfus Pineda, “Cuba's electoral system and the dilemmas of the twenty-first century: Between the liberal-democratic tradition and true participation”, Socialism and Democracy, 30:1, p. 91 ff. and D. Kaltsonis, “The future of people’s power in Cuba”, [Greek Edition, περ. Ουτοπία, τ. 123, 2018], p. 43 ff.

ΒΙΒΛΙΑ

ΒΙΝΤΕΟ

ENGLISH EDITION