The importance of revolutionary democracy is manifested in two critical axes of the socialist economy: the planning of economic development and the distribution of wealth. The pace and priorities of development, social spending, the distribution of the social product, and wage policy were issues that preoccupied the revolutions of the 20th century.
Particularly during critical periods, states were called upon to make serious decisions, such as in the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union, when the issue of resource allocation between heavy and light industry was of paramount importance in view of the approaching major military confrontation. The same thing happened in China in the late 1950s, when there was intense debate within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party about the pace of development, the role of the rural economy, and a number of other related issues.1
The pace of the elimination of commodity relations—in particular, the socialization of small producers in agriculture, crafts, and trade—was also a critical issue. The goal of the socialist revolutions was the complete elimination of private ownership of the means of production. However, as history has shown, the case of small-scale ownership requires special handling, especially in countries where small producers constitute a significant part of economic activity and productive capacity.
Lenin had spotted this problem early on and therefore favoured voluntary cooperativisation as the way for farmers to transition to a socialised economy. The reason was that farmers had to be persuaded by their own experience of the benefits of joining cooperatives. There were two sides to this: the first was that the socialist sector of the economy would demonstrate its productive superiority, and the second was that the transition had to be voluntary and not forced. This second aspect reconnects the issue with democracy. In other words, the revolutionary party had to convince small producers, based on their own experience, of the necessity and benefits of the transition.
In practice, we know that the 1930s saw violent a collectivisation, which the Soviet government justified on the basis of the exceptional circumstances of an impending war, an argument that cannot be dismissed as entirely unfounded. However, there are also those, such as Fidel Castro, who believe that violent collectivization was not necessary, that it was politically damaging as it alienated many farmers from the revolutionary regime, and that it was not economically effective.2
The experience of the Chinese revolution was similar but also somewhat different. In the initial period, voluntary association was favoured, with excellent results. After 1958, however, it was decided, without broader public debate and despite the objections of a strong minority in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to proceed with violent collectivisation, with disastrous socio-economic and political results. In both cases, the importance of the democratic process and the need for persuasion rather than imposition from above became apparent.
Implementation problems
State planning initially proved to be a particularly effective tool. It led to victory over the forces of Nazism, revived economies after the war, and transformed the USSR from a backward, semi-feudal country into a developed, leading industrial power. The USSR, whose industrial production was only 1/8th that of the US in 1913, became the second largest industrial and technological power in the world, even conquering space first. By the mid-1960s, the USSR’s GDP had reached half that of the US. China, on the other hand, had an average annual GDP growth rate of 10% from the victory of the revolution until 1990, despite some fluctuations. Similarly, Cuba had an average GDP growth of 10% from the victory of the revolution until 1990, while achieving a very high level of social rights protection. In general, these countries, through ups and downs, mistakes, errors, and successes, emerged from chronic backwardness and developed their productive forces, dramatically improving their social indicators.
Problems had already arisen in the Soviet Union after World War II. The cause of the problems should not be sought in planning but in the way planning took place, which was essentially administrative and bureaucratic, and therefore became ineffective at a certain point. In extraordinary circumstances, like those of civil war or the German Nazi invasion, the lack of popular participation in planning was to be expected. It was supplanted by the enthusiasm and popular effort to win.
But as conditions returned to normal, it became apparent that planning was not truly democratic and popular, since participation was largely formal. Historical experience has shown that the democratic participation of workers had waned, leading, along with other factors, to various negative consequences. This was undoubtedly influenced by negative conditions, such as constant military and economic pressure from the domestic and international bourgeoisie, enormous economic difficulties since the revolutions prevailed in countries with low development of productive forces, lack of experience, etc.
Thus, revolutionary democracy gradually weakened. At the end of the civil war and the imperialist intervention in Russia, the grassroots assemblies and local Soviets had almost ceased to function.3 There was a very strong tendency to delegate political tasks to those in power. Assemblies, electoral procedures, the principles of electivity, popular control over representatives, and revocability became largely formal and devoid of real content, losing their momentum. The electoral process became a mere formality. Debate and control of representatives became sluggish or ended up being completely formalistic. Although all the constitutions of socialist states provided for the possibility of recalling representatives, this right was rarely, if ever, exercised, at least at the level of the highest representative body.4
It is characteristic that the Soviet leaders themselves spoke, as early as in 1937, of degenerative phenomena whereby democratic procedures in the Soviets had become purely nominal, in reality covering up a clientelist system of relations in which the representatives of the people were unaccountable. They were not accountable, or their accountability was not meaningful, while they considered their re-election to be certain and guaranteed.5 Similar testimonies exist from other sources. For example, the Cuban correspondent in Moscow during the last period of the Soviet Union speaks of ‘corrupt electoral processes’.6
The political privilege of those in power to make decisions was compounded by material privileges, which distanced them from the living conditions of the people and created mistrust among them. Contrary to the principles of the Commune and Lenin’s recommendations, the situation took a different turn. The ratio between the basic wage and the wages of the highest echelons of the ruling class in the Soviet Union was already 1:10 in the 1930s and later rose to 1:15 or even 1:20. Similar developments took place in other socialist countries. In China, this gap had already reached 1:10 in the 1950s and 1960s, and at times 1:15 (Mandel 1994, 112 ff. and Betelem 1974 vol. 1, 107, Betelem vol. 2, 247, Markovits 1975, 51, Vlachou-Mavrokefalos 1989, 169-170, Trolliet 1981, 264).7 In addition to salary privileges, there were various other privileges, such as access to special services in health, education, housing, etc. It is characteristic that the leading cadres of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had, at least in the last period, service personnel, gardeners, etc. These legal privileges were sometimes supplemented by others, acquired illegally.
Similar developments took place in workplace democracy. There, too, worker participation in discussions on critical economic decisions became largely symbolic. As Cuban economist Carlos Tablada notes, the focus was solely on the implementation of decisions taken at government level, rather than on the participation of workers in the development and evaluation of policies.8 Che Guevara had made similar observations many years earlier.9
The great economic achievements of the first revolutionary period began to weaken. Economic indicators began to signal stagnation and sometimes decline. Imbalances and inefficiencies in planning were caused. There was a decline in willingness to work and, consequently, a decline in labour productivity.10 There were imbalances and, at times, injustices in the distribution of social wealth.
Economic targets were adopted that were sometimes excessive and unattainable, the result of unilateral decisions by the leadership. One of the most extreme examples was the period of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in China.11 Conversely, in other cases, plans were sometimes excessively low as a result of the indifference and underlying reaction of workers to the fact that their needs and desires were not being met.12
Lenin, concerned about such a turn of events, pointed out as early as in 1918 the danger of bureaucratic detachment of the Soviet leaders: ‘there is a petty-bourgeois tendency to turn Soviet members into ‘parliamentarians’ or, on the other hand, into bureaucrats’. He even spoke openly about the bureaucratic deformation of the revolutionary state. ‘The struggle against the bureaucratic deformation of the Soviet organization is ensured by the stability of the Soviets with the ‘people’’.13 A few years later, in December 1920, he wrote that the state born of the revolution was ‘a workers’ state with a bureaucratic distortion’.14 He repeated the same thing a little later.15 For this reason, in one of his last works, he noted that ‘many times we will still need to finish, rebuild, start from scratch’.16 He saw the antidote to bureaucratic distortion in the various forms of ‘control from below, in order to paralyse any possibility of distorting Soviet power, to constantly and tirelessly uproot the weeds of bureaucracy’.17
Elements of a market economy instead of democratisation
The rulers of socialist states tried to address the problems in planning and in the development of productive forces by expanding the autonomy of enterprises and managers, introducing limited profit motives, providing incentives to managers, and ultimately expanding commodity relations. The reforms that took place with variations in the Soviet Union and other countries in the 1960s are characteristic in this regard. However, central planning remained in place without any serious steps being taken towards democratisation and meaningful participation of workers in it. Although corrective measures were taken after Khrushchev’s dismissal, sometimes with restrictions of market elements, the direction of subsequent efforts did not change substantially.18
Overall, these kinds of changes weakened the principle of ‘to each according to their work’, creating greater imbalances in wage policy and central economic planning, despite not questioning the latter’s place in economic production. However, these policies did not give workers a meaningful role in economic and other decision-making—something that was absolutely necessary in order to activate the popular factor: to make people feel that the decisions concerned them, and to stimulate interest in work and the management of the economy.19
Leaders found themselves generally trapped in a dilemma, with neither side being able to resolve the problems. On the one hand, the proposed solution was to expand commodity relations; on the other, it was to return to rigid central planning without meaningful participation by the people. It is characteristic that the criticism levelled by former top officials of the CPSU, such as Molotov, towards the policy of limited commodification, while containing correct aspects, was not oriented towards strengthening the democratic participation of workers in political and economic decision-making.20
On the contrary, the expansion of commodity relations gave rise to competing social interests and favoured the ‘black economy’, which grew from 3.4% of GDP in 1960 to 20% in 1988.21 It led to the fragmentation of the workforce, the strengthening of local and national ‘guild’ interests, increased corruption at all levels, and further weakened the relationship between the leadership and the people. Among other things, it proved to be economically ineffective. It did not eliminate the root cause of the problem, namely the lack of meaningful democratic participation. The latter was not strengthened, and therefore interest and productivity in the workplace were not boosted. Of course, until the mid-1980s, the general trend was positive, the economy was growing, and the standard of living rose significantly. However, the problems remained.
The policy of expanding commodity relations had a major impact on the distribution of the social product. It meant that the remuneration of managers increased further in practical terms. Material incentives (especially for managers) were often interpreted as remuneration in excess of the actual labour supply. The practice of providing false data to the government in order to appropriate part of the product and channel it to the black market became widespread. Control from both above and below weakened even further.22
Furthermore, certain categories of workers were paid based on the profitability of the business rather than on their contribution to the workforce, meaning that they were either overpaid or underpaid in relation to their contribution. As a result, there was a departure from the principle ‘to each according to their work’. The ever-growing segment of those who worked in small private companies or had income from the black economy were already excluded from that principle anyway.
The qualitative shift took place after 1985 and especially after 1987, when the trend towards strengthening commodity relations intensified and acquired new qualitative characteristics, which led to the abolition of planning. This caused a decline in economic indicators and a deterioration in the standard of living of people in the USSR. National income increased by 2.3% in 1986, and by 1.6% in 1987; while industrial production fell from 4.4% to 3.8% and agricultural production from 5.3% to 0.6%. In 1991, national income fell by 15%, industrial production by 7%, and agricultural production by 9%. In 1990, 27.6% of the population lived in poverty, and in 1991, 31% lived in poverty.23
It should be emphasised, however, that the economic problems of the USSR, even in the 1980s, were not insurmountable, nor did they require the overthrow of the socialist system in favour of capitalist restoration. Contrary to what their propaganda publicly proclaimed, the leaders of the imperialist powers considered the economic potential of the USSR to be the greatest threat. Margaret Thatcher expressed this publicly in 1991.24 Economic difficulties could be addressed, but not by resorting to a transition to a market economy or a return to non-participatory central planning, but rather by re-establishing democratic planning. In this context, it could be discussed whether and to what extent it was necessary, depending on the conditions in each country, to use certain market tools but also to overcome the inequalities and violations of the principle ‘to each according to his work’.
Reaffirming the dominant role of the working class was the only way to overcome any difficulties. This, in turn, required a different relationship between the party and state leadership and the people, based on dialectical interaction and revolutionary democracy. The restoration of its principles was more than necessary. In other words, it was necessary to put into practice the principles of electivity and revocability, and to involve workers in procedures and decisions at all levels. In a climate of social discontent and economic problems, it was particularly important to apply the principle of abolishing any privileges enjoyed by those in power. This would have restored the people’s confidence in the ruling parties.
However, this solution was not pursued. The leaders, or at least the majority of them, were objectively unable to chart such a course due to their own social position (which was defined by economic and political privileges). They preferred the path of capitalist restoration, securing for themselves a dominant position in the economy and politics. Some minorities wavered, unable to connect with the people and chart a revolutionary course.
Some conclusions: Revolutionary democracy and distribution of social wealth
The democratic participation of workers is necessary for the distribution of the social wealth produced. In socialist society, an effort is made to apply the principle ‘to each according to their work’. But how is work measured, evaluated, and assessed? And above all, who calculates it in a social formation where individual ownership of the means of production does not prevail? Calculating the labour power expended by each worker is a complex scientific and political issue. The findings of various sciences and social experience can suggest ways of calculating one type of work or another. However, the conclusions of science and experience may differ in their assessments. The calculation is not only a technical issue but also a socio-political decision.
Consequently, society itself must have the final and decisive say on the criteria adopted. Therefore, the role of democracy is decisive here too. How will society value an hour of work by a teacher, a programmer, a miner, or a bailiff? What is the average quantity and quality of work that should be provided in each professional category? The workers themselves, through their democratic institutions, can determine the relevant criteria.
The determination of the production plan at the national, sectoral, operational, and individual levels is a social decision, which must be taken through substantive democratic processes. The implementation of these decisions must also be monitored through democratic institutions and be transparent and multifaceted, from the top down and from the bottom up.25 As Guevara pointed out, ‘[An] ambitious development plan that seeks to put all the popular forces into intensive operation cannot be separated from them. We must build it all together, so that everyone understands it, everyone grasps its essence, and thus everyone helps to get the job done’.26
Workers can and must decide through their democratic institutions on the basic principles of wage policy, such as the wage gap: that is, whether the ratio between the minimum and maximum wages will be 1:2, 1:4, 1:10, or more, and which occupational categories will be at the bottom and which at the top of the wage gap? All this naturally requires open dialogue, knowledge, and information. That is why, for example, Lenin argued that the press in a socialist society ‘will put the issues of everyday economic life to the judgment of the masses and help them to study them seriously’.27
It goes without saying that society does not need to and should not decide on every detail.28 However, it is absolutely necessary to adopt general principles at the national level. These can then be specified by the individual sectoral and local bodies of the democratically organised workers’ power.
Assessing the working conditions and measuring labour supply in different units within the same sector of the economy can be the subject of a collective, democratic decision by the respective sectoral bodies of socialist power. The same applies to the measurement of the work provided by each individual worker. This cannot be done arbitrarily, nor solely on the basis of the hours worked, but on the basis of generally or specifically established social criteria and rules. In specifying these criteria and rules and in measuring the work of employees, the institutions of workers’ democracy must have the decisive say.
It goes without saying that, within the framework of necessary labour discipline, this measurement is carried out by the supervisor or manager, but on the basis of criteria democratically determined by society. Furthermore, in the event of any arbitrariness on the part of managers, specialist collective institutions must be able to make a second-level assessment.
In conclusion, historical experience has shown that the smooth, effective functioning of the multi-level institutions of revolutionary democracy is absolutely necessary. Through planning and subjective assessment of objective data, the people must:
1. determine the purpose and specific objectives of economic development ;
2. determine the respective proportions (means of production to means of consumption, etc.);
3. choose the means of development (type of technologies, spatial parameters, and their evaluation in terms of environmental, economic, and social effectiveness);
4. define and evaluate the criteria by which the means of consumption are distributed; and
5. define the pace and manner of the elimination of commodity relations.
Dimitris Kaltsonis is Professor of State and Law Theory at Panteion University, Athens.
1 D Kaltsonis, Τhe State in China (1919–1949) (in Greek), Athens: Topos, 2019, 97 ff., 135 ff.
2 Ι Ramone, One Hundred Hours with Fidel (biography in two voices) (in Greek), Athens : Parakis, 2007, 227 and
T Borge, Un grano de maiz (Entrevista concedida por Fidel Castro a Tomas Borge, 1992), ed. «El perro y la rana», Caracas, 2011, 58.
3 C Bettelheim, Class Struggle in USSR, vol. 1 (1923–1930) (in Greek), Athens: Kedros, 1974, 329 ff.
4 M Miaille, Τhe Rechstaat (introduction to a critique of constitutional law) (in Greek), Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1983, 188 ff. and VI Lenin, Collected Worksvol. 35(in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 106–107, 109–111.
5 Α Zdanov, ‘Address to the Plenary of the CC of RCP (Bolsh.), 29/2/1937’ (in Greek), Communist Review, 4/2008, 145 ff.
6 P. Para, “Por que cayo el sosialismo en Europa? Por que no cayo Cuba?”, 9/9/2015, www.cubadebate.cu
7 Α Vlachou and P Mavrokefalos, The Socialist Transformation of China (in Greek), Athens: Foundation of Mediterranean Studies, 1989, 169–170. E Mandel, Power and Money (Marxist theory of bureaucracy) (in Greek), Athens: Vanguard Library, 1994, 112 ff. Μ Markovic, Self-management, Athens: Epicuros, 1975, 51. C Bettelheim, vol. 1, 107 and vol. 2 247. P. Trolliet, La Chine et son économie, Paris : Armand Colin, 1981, 264
8 G Polymeridis, Scientific Socialism: Critique of its critics (in Greek), Athens: Entos, 2011, 153. C Tablada, Che Guevara: the Political Economy of Socialist Construction (in Greek), Athens: Diethnes Vima, 2014, 305. C Bettelheim, Vol. 2, 204ff.
9 D Kaltzonis, Che on the State and Revolution (in Greek), Athens: Topos, 2012, 152 ff.
10 J.L. Rodriguez, ‘La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones (II)’, Cubadebate.cu, 16/5/2016
11 Kaltsonis 2019, 135 ff.
12 Tablada 2014, 426 ff.
13 VI Lenin, Collected Works vol. 36 (in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 203-206.
14 VI Lenin, Collected Works vol. 42 (in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 208.
15 ibid., 239
16 VI Lenin, Collected Works vol. 44 (in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 224.
17 VI Lenin, Collected Works vol. 36 (in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 206.
18 JL Rodriguez, ‘La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones (II)’, Cubadebate.cu, 16/5/2016
19 JL Rodriguez, ‘La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones (III)’, Cubadebate.cu, 16/5/2016
20 V Molotov, To the Central Committee of the CPSU (1965), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2024, 211 ff.
21 JL Rodriguez, ‘La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones (III)’, Cubadebate.cu, 16/5/2016
22 Tablada 2014, 467.
23 JL Rodriguez, ‘La desaparicion de la URSS 25 anos despues: Algunas reflexiones (IV and V)’, Cubadebate.cu, 16/5/2016
24 OJ Villar Barroso, ‘El papel de la politica en el hundimiento sovietico’, Temas, n. 78:25–32, 2014, 30.
25 E Che Guevara, Apuntes críticos a la Economía Política, Melbourne, Ocean Press, 2006
147.
26 ibid., 92
27 VI Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 36 (in Greek), Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2004, 191.
28 Mandel 2003, 8 ff.
